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Abstract
This paper examines the role of trade union and the type of wage bargainings in economic
geography model. It is shown that stronger trade unions in both regions would put a stronger
pressure toward agglomeration of ﬁrms. Under core-periphery distribution of ﬁrms, this eﬀect
can act the role as anchorage of ﬁrms. Moreover, we extend to several employment environments,
which are the outside options of workers, and examine the eﬀects on location equilibria. A key
message of the paper is that generous unemployment beneﬁt and stronger trade union make the
distribution of ﬁrms more uneven and sustainable.
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11 Introduction
Previous empirical studies conﬁrm that inward FDI is sensitive to the labour market ﬂexibility.
Higher employment protection reduces FDI. Dewit, Gorg and Montagna (2009) is an exceptional
empirical analysis in the literature on FDI and labour market ﬂexibility which shows the anchorage
eﬀect of employment protection legislation on location decisions of ﬁrms. Using FDI stocks, labour
market ﬂexibility, GDP of home and host country, and union density of OECD countries data, Dewit
et al. (2009) show that domestic levels of employment protection discourage outward FDI, anchorage
eﬀect. They conclude that “Given that employment protection can help to anchor domestic industry
by discouraging relocation, industrialized countries with a large industrial base will be able to sustain
high levels of ﬁring costs” and “Developing countries with a small industrial base may instead have
an incentive to pursue ﬂexible labour market policies”. Moreover, Their results also indicate that
union density is negatively signiﬁcant and aﬀects the location decision of FDI as the employment
protections legislation does. Thus these eﬀects coming from labour market rigidities could retain the
domestic capitals soaking from the home country. In this paper, we construct a model which would
explain these phenomena with trade union wage bargaining and show the several eﬀects analytically
with location choice by ﬁrms.
On the one hand, not only high employment protection and strong trade unions but also disper-
sion of regional unemployment rate is widely observed in European countries. These employment
environments are discussed as regional characteristics and the determinants of location decision of
ﬁrms. However, these environments, themselves, are results and are determined by location decision
of ﬁrms. This causality might be important to consider regional labour market rigidity.
Most of the analyses on diverse unemployment are taken in a national perspective. Blanchard
and Wolfers (2000) explain the dispersed unemployment rates across nations from the role of insti-
tution, and of shock and both of them. They show while the role of institutions in labour market
itself partially explains the heterogeneity in unemployment rate, when both are included, they and
their interactions explains much better. Although their analysis is nation level in Europe, they
show that the response to the shock and the magnitude of the shock is diﬀerent with countries and
not only the institution but also country-speciﬁc characteristics play an important role. However,
as Elhorst (2003) points out, there is a lack of studies on unemployment in regional level. Overman
and Puga (2002) is one of the exception. After controlling several regional characteristics which
may explain similarities among neighbouring regions, they show that there are still signiﬁcant ten-
dencies of clustering regions which have high (low) unemployment rate and high (low) per capita
and the uneven distribution of regional unemployment rate and income disparities. They stress
2that the polarization has been demand rather than supply driven, that the polarized regions are
not constrained with national borders, and that the disparities has hysteresis with transition ma-
trix. European countries have promoted its integration to an uniﬁed market and, at the same time,
and have experienced integration of world economy. These phenomena are explained by tremendous
reduction of trade costs. Along with these phenomena, the rapid developments in transport technol-
ogy accelerate regional disparities in income and unemployment environment within and between
countries, which leads to the economic integration among regions. These economic integrations
induce more competition in the product market and relocation of ﬁrms and plants. In the previ-
ous literature, European low mobility is stressed and modeled based on this. Decressin and Fatas
(1995) show regional unemployment variation in Europe with comparing that in United States by
Blanchard and Katz (1992)1. They show that large portion of employment shocks are region and
not country-speciﬁc in Europe and that interregional migration even within countries in response to
shocks is not substantial. Following their analysis, several empirical studies conﬁrm European low
mobility. Furthermore, most of the theories follow their result and note that European workers are
immobile across countries and even regions. For example, referring to Decressin and Fatas (1995),
and the others, Picard and Toulemonde (2006) construct a two-region model with capital mobility
and immobile workers with trade unions. They show that the premium wage set by trade union
can act as an agglomeration force of ﬁrms and this induces polarization of ﬁrms and disparities of
regional incomes. While Decressin and Fatas (1995) use European data from 1970’s to 1980’s, Tani
(2003) deal with that from 1988 to 1997 and show that the mobility of Europeans is improved.
Since the higher mobility in goods and workers is one of the original purpose of European Union,
higher mobility in workers need to be investigated. There might be suﬃcient institutional diﬀer-
ences between new members and former members, which can be mentioned as transition. Overman
and Puga (2002) uses neighbouring regional data of NUTS 2 in former member states from 1986 to
1996. Thus their analysis avoids the eﬀect of new members in transition. Focusing on transitional
economies, in particular on Central and Eastern Europe, Ferragina and Pastore (2008) surveyed the
literature and analyzed the source of regional unemployment diﬀerentials based on optimal speed
of transition model. As long as we consider symmetric two regions, it might be reasonable to focus
on the scope of our analysis within 15 member states with similar population. However, still we
could introduce institutional asymmetries in this setup. When we include new member states in our
analysis, it should be asymmetric productivities with diﬀerent institutions2. Overman and Puga
1They conducted regional unemployment rate in U.S. and show the high mobility of workers across states.
2The concept of disequilibrium in transition of regional economies provoked by Marston (1985) is surveyed and
examined in Ferragina and Pastore (2008).
3(2002) set a simple model to describe their results. However, it is not suﬃcient to understand the
dispersion of regional unemployment and polarization in EU. There is one regional unemployment
study reasoning the unemployment polarization. Puga (2002) argue this process based on some
results of economic geography models. However, it models neither the aspect of institution nor
unemployment, explicitly. Our model could provide some explanations for the discussions in Puga
(2002).
To delve further on the interactions among agglomeration economies, trade union and unem-
ployment, we construct a simple model of economic geography to shows the polarization process of
unemployment and regional income among regions. We explicitly model imperfection in product
and labour market. The model employ two region and two goods with entrepreneurs and immobile
workers, where increasing returns to scale sector is unionized. We show that presence of trade
unions may increase the wage of workers and this wage premium could act as an agglomeration
force. Furthermore, we explicitly introduce several environments of unemployment and bargaining
and show the eﬀects from these diﬀerences. We are also interested in the eﬀect of reduction in
transport cost, which describes the economic integration of regions. This paper diﬀers from the
existing literature in several ways. First, we do not relay on a partial equilibrium framework but
allow for general equilibrium. This is important for the consequences of the outside options in the
union bargaining, which are determined in equilibrium. Second, we explicitly integrate the policy
variables and allow our analysis to examine the eﬀect of trade liberalization. As pointed out by
Munch (2003), the threat point depends on the distribution of economic activities such that the em-
ployment opportunities for displaced workers depend on the number of ﬁrms locates in their region.
Although Picard and Toulemonde (2006) exhibit a model explaining the evidence of agglomeration
with unionized economy in EU, the model lacks the explanation of stylized aspects in EU, such
as high unemployment rate and generous social security. Third, contrary to the previous studies3,
we assume mobility of entrepreneurs based on the model as in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and
Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud (2003). This allows us to analyze the bar-
gaining process between mobile entrepreneurs and immobile workers with location choice of ﬁrms.
This view is consistent with the study by Tani (2003) that European mobility is increasing.
3For example, Munch (2003) and Picard and Toulemonde (2006) assume not labour mobility but capital mobility.
Thus their analysis explain national perspective rather than regional one.
42 The Model
2.1 Consumers
We consider an economy composed of two regions and two sectors of production, competitive
sector (C) and manufacturing sectors (M).
There are two types of factors which are diﬀerent in their mobility. One is entrepreneurs and the
other is workers. While entrepreneurs are mobile across regions, workers are immobile. For simpler
notation and calculation, total population of workers and entrepreneurs in this economy are set as
1 by each. We express the equally distributed immobile workers as 1=2:We put ¸; (1 ¡ ¸);as the
share of entrepreneurs in region r; (s) in this economy.
We assume each region is identical as for the initial endowments, the preference of workers and
trade openness. While in M¡sector, ﬁrms are under Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition
and unionized in each ﬁrm, homogeneous good is produced under constant-returns technology in C



















where C is the consumption of homogeneous good, and mr (i) is the consumption of diﬀerentiated
manufactured good i produced in region r. The total number of ﬁrms in manufacturing sector in
region r is expressed by nr and ¾ express the elasticity of substitution between any two of diﬀeren-
tiated varieties. While homogeneous good is shipped with no transport cost, manufactured goods
are assumed to incur “iceberg” type transport costs. Thus one unit of each variety of manufactured
goods shipped from one region to the other be arrived with the proportion 0 < ' < 1 respectively.
From the consumer’s utility maximization, we obtain the total sales of each variety produced by a
ﬁrm, q (i), is as follows:
mr (i) = ¹pr (i)
¡¾ ¡
P¾¡1












1¡¾ are deﬁned as trade openness and
a price index for each diﬀerentiated goods, respectively. When we set pC as the price of competitive





The share of entrepreneurs in a region equals to the share of ﬁrms in the region.
52.2 Producer Behavior
Our model is a standard monopolistic competition with two-country and two sector. As men-
tioned in the introduction, the main focus of our analysis is the labour market imperfection and
wage bargaining. Two sectors are refereed to as unionized (M) manufacturing and competitive (C)
sector. There are two production factors, workers and entrepreneurs. The production of C sector is
under a constant return technology with only labour input and is traded at no cost. Since there is
no transportation cost on this good, regional prices are equal between regions. Thus we normalize
the price of competitive good as pC = wT = 1.
In M sector, we assume each monopolistic competitive ﬁrm is unionized. M sector’s production
requires one unit of workers as marginal cost and one unit of entrepreneurs as ﬁxed cost. This would
be the case that an entrepreneur establish one ﬁrm which produce mr (i) unit of a diﬀerentiated
variety. The proﬁt function can be written as,
¼r (i) = (pr (i) ¡ cwr (i))mr (i) ¡ Wr (5)
where wr, and Wr are worker wage and entrepreneur wage in region r. Proﬁt maximization of a
ﬁrm in unionized sector is constrained with the bargaining structure. In brief, there are two types of
bargaining structures which are well known “Eﬃcient bargaining ” and “Right to manage”. Besides
these diﬀerences, we specify the environments that express diﬀerent possibility of outside options
in the following section, which is an expected opportunity for a worker who cannot take the job in
the ﬁrm negotiated. Time sequence of events is that in the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms choose their location
and in the second stage ﬁrm and union conclude their negotiation. Firms are assumed to know
the regional environments on the workers’ outside option including possibility of obtaining a job in
competitive sector or in manufacturing sector, unemployment beneﬁt, and unemployment rate.
From the assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition, each ﬁrms are atom-
istically small to the macroeconomic variables, average wages, distribution of ﬁrms, and regional










We could see that the entrepreneurs’ reward is proportional to their proﬁt. However, depending
on the institution, the entrepreneurs’ reward can be varied as we will see.
2.3 Bargaining structures
It is our focus how institutional structures including several unemployment environments aﬀect
the distribution of ﬁrms. Thus we specify bargaining process in two styles: one is “ Eﬃcient bargain-
6ing (E)”4, where bargaining takes place over wage and employment cooperatively, and the other is
“ Right to manage (R)”, where bargaining takes place only over wage. Each ﬁrm bargain with l(i)
workers, which is assumed to be proportional to its output from (5). We assume the bargaining
process using the Nash bargaining solution. There are one union in each monopolistic ﬁrm. Since
ﬁrms are assumed to be atomistic, each ﬁrm and union set wages, taking the unemployment rate
and wages in other ﬁrms as given. As in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), we posit the bargaining
problem for union and a ﬁrm in M sector in logarithm as,
L = ¯
h
log(wr (i) ¡ zr)lr (i)
i
+ (1 ¡ ¯)
h
log(pr (i) ¡ cwr (i))qr (i)
i
(7)
where ¯ is the trade union’s bargaining power of manufacturing sector and z is the outside option
of workers. While trade liberalization and decreasing transport cost may aﬀect this bargaining
power negatively, we assume it is unchanged. In both equations, the ﬁrst term implies the surplus
of workers who are members of the trade union and is composed of the premium wage and their
fall-back point, outside option. The second term implies a ﬁrm’s net proﬁt. As for the ﬁrm’s net
proﬁt, second term of the equations in (7) is derived from the diﬀerence of proﬁt ¼i ¡ ¼i; where ¼i
is a ﬁrm’s fall-back point and is idle. Fixed cost of manufacturing is assumed to be incurred before
the bargaining stage5. For the detailed calculation, see in Appendix I.
In eﬃcient bargaining allows the union and the ﬁrm bargain over wage and employment. So as
















Since the price is not aﬀected by the presence of trade union as in (8), employment level is also
not aﬀected by the bargaining. Thus price and employment level is the same as the competitive
case.
Contrary to eﬃcient bargaining, right to manage process, at ﬁrst, the union and the ﬁrm bargain
only over wage. Then the ﬁrm determines its production level with the bargained wages. Following




















4This assumption allows us to model the cases where include the stronger trade union and the less their employment
erosion.
5Further assumption on the expectation of entrepreneur can be posed. One of the example might be that, assuming
the risk neutrality of entrepreneur, the introduction of expectation on proﬁt between regions. However, we do not
further investigate in this respect.
7The wage premium respect to outside option is expressed in the ﬁrst parenthesis of (9) and
(8) in each case. Comparing to both outcomes, it is obvious that employment levels are diﬀerent.
Since the price under right to mange is reﬂected the bargaining power of trade union and is set
higher than eﬃcient bargaining and competitive labour market case, employment level under right
to mange is lower than the others. This is due to the fact that right to manage bargaining structure
allows entrepreneurs to determine the price in the form of double marginalization. Without loss of
generality, we assume ﬁrms in unionized sector are symmetric. Thus the ﬁrm-speciﬁc subscript (i)





























Since the production of manufacturing good requires one unit of entrepreneur for one ﬁrm, the
share of ﬁrms is equal to the share of entrepreneurs in the region, ¸. From the above equations,
it is clear that while under right to manage case, stronger bargaining power make the price index
higher, eﬃcient bargaining case does not aﬀect price index. This diﬀerence in price index directly
aﬀects the real wages under each bargaining structure diﬀerent.
For simplicity, we posit the outside option such that those who cannot take their position
in unionized sector are all reemployed in competitive sector. Since workers’ wage in competitive
sector is normalized into one, the outside option is also one, z = 1. We set this speciﬁcation as a
benchmark case. Later, in section 6, we extends into several cases. This benchmark case is quite









. While workers’ wage in competitive sector is normalized
into one, those who work in unionized monopolistic sector earn negotiated wage. This wage premium































There is a clear diﬀerence between two bargaining structure in the marginal reward to en-
trepreneurs. It is easily shown that the marginal reward to entrepreneurs is the ﬁrst parentheses in
the above equations and is diﬀerent under each bargaining structure. Since in both cases wages set
in unionized ﬁrms are the same, the diﬀerence comes from the price setting behavior. Substituting
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Es










¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)Á
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Since ¹ expresses the expenditure share of manufacturing goods, the brackets with ¹ can be
interpreted as the deﬂated expenditure on manufacturing goods in this economy. Comparing to the
two expressions, there is a clear diﬀerence between two bargaining structures in the marginal reward
to entrepreneurs, in another words, the source of wage premium to workers. The diﬀerence lies in
the previous term in front of the brackets. When there is no trade union, this term is expressed
as ¹=¾ and means the reward to entrepreneurs for their investment on ﬁxed costs6. Under eﬃcient
bargaining structure, the reward to entrepreneurs reﬂects the bargaining power as (1 ¡ ¯)=¾ in (14).
This means that a fraction of reward to entrepreneurs is transferred to workers and is the source of
wage premium. This form can be interpreted as a kind of proﬁt sharing. On the other hand, under
right to manage structure, the reward to entrepreneurs is unaﬀected by the bargaining as in (15).
This latter result is due to the double marginalization by entrepreneurs since employment level is
determined so as to maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁt with the bargained wage taken as given. Thus the
source of wage premium comes from the higher price set on their product. This diﬀerence in price
setting between both bargaining structures makes the eﬀect of trade union on location equilibria
varied, as shown in the next section.
Furthermore, suppose the brackets in each equation are constant in a partial equilibrium view, we
ﬁnd that reward to entrepreneurs is lower under eﬃcient bargaining and that the eﬀects of stronger
bargaining power on reward to entrepreneurs are also diﬀerent. While under eﬃcient bargaining
structure stronger bargaining power induces the reward to entrepreneurs decrease, under right to
manage bargaining structure it doesn’t change.
Since both equations are analogous expressions, we posit the parameter which express the ratio of
an entrepreneurs’ rewards over total expenditure as ±b; and the subscript b expresses the bargaining
type. Under the benchmark case, this reward ratios are ±E ´ ¹(1 ¡ ¯)=¾; and ±R ´ ¹=¾. Then we
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Diﬀerent from a one-country model of general equilibrium7, our two-country model still keeps the
interregional distribution of ﬁrms in the price index. The bracket expresses the weighted expenditure
6See Baldwin et al. (2003) in detail.
7See for example Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
9of this economy. The expenditure on manufacturing goods is expressed as ¹ multiplied to the
bracket. Then we could see that the reward to entrepreneurs from their investment on ﬁxed cost is
expressed by ±b.






















































r ±b and we put wb¤
r and pb¤
r as the optimal price under certain bar-




























This shows that the presence of trade union and bargaining structure comes on a composite
in front of the bracket This expression is composed of the rewards to entrepreneurs in sales of a
diﬀerentiated ﬁrm, ±b, and an eﬀect from the bargaining structure, ±b´b. These parameters are a
composite of elasticity of substitution, the share of expenditure on manufactured goods and the














(¾+¯¡1)¾ where b = R
(19)
These expressions show the eﬀect of bargaining power on regional incomes and allocative eﬀect on







¾, entrepreneurs can also enjoy higher (lower) reward com-














¾. Thus under right to manage bargaining structure, there is positive
allocative eﬀect. In sum, while under eﬃcient bargaining structure regional income is not aﬀected
by bargaining power, under right to manage bargaining the bargaining power plays an allocative
eﬀect from workers to entrepreneurs. This allocative eﬀect makes regional income more dependent
on the ﬁrms’ (and entrepreneurs’) distribution of manufacturing sector than that under competitive
labour market case and that under eﬃcient bargaining structure.






±b + ±b´b ¡ 1
¢
2Á¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)
¡
Á2 ¡ ±b´b ¡ ±b + ±bÁ2 + ±bÁ2´b + 1
¢







±b + ±b´b ¡ 1
¢
2Á(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸
¡
Á2 ¡ ±b´b ¡ ±b + ±bÁ2 + ±bÁ2´b + 1
¢




L(¸ + Á(1 ¡ ¸))
2
¡
±b + ±b´b ¡ 1
¢
(1 ¡ ¸) + Á¸ ¡ ±b (1 ¡ ¸) + ±bÁ¸ ¡ ±b´b (1 ¡ ¸) + ±bÁ´b¸




L((1 ¡ ¸) + Á¸)
2
¡
±b + ±b´b ¡ 1
¢
¡
¸ ¡ ±b¸ + Á(1 ¡ ¸) + ±bÁ(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ±b´b¸ + ±bÁ´b (1 ¡ ¸)
¢
±b¸(1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ Á)(1 + Á)(1 + ´b) ¡ (¸ + Á(1 ¡ ¸))((1 ¡ ¸) + Á¸)
(23)






2Á¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)
¡
Á2 ¡ ±b´b ¡ ±b + ±bÁ2 + ±bÁ2´b + 1
¢
2Á(1 ¡ ¸) + ¸
¡
Á2 ¡ ±b´b ¡ ±b + ±bÁ2 + ±bÁ2´b + 1
¢ (24)
Without loss of generality, we normalize the total population of entrepreneurs and immobile
workers as one, H = L = 1.
3 Location equilibrium
We examine the stability of location equilibrium under symmetric and core-periphery distribu-
tion. While symmetric distribution is the equilibrium such that the number of ﬁrms is equal in both
regions, core-periphery distribution is the equilibrium such that all ﬁrms locate in one region. In
this section, we assume that both regions are symmetric in the sense that the bargaining structures
and outside options are the same. Since entrepreneurs are mobile across regions, they could choose
their residential place. Evaluating their indirect utility diﬀerential, they choose the region where
give them higher indirect utility. When no worker could get a higher utility level by changing their












or at 4V (¸) · 0 or at 4V (¸) ¸ 1. Such an equilibrium always exists since Vr (¸) is a contin-
uous function of ¸. A spatial equilibrium is (locally) stable, if, for any marginal deviation of the
population distribution from the equilibrium, the equation of motion.
˙ ¸ = ¸(1 ¡ ¸)4V (¸) (26)
While as long as 4V (¸) is negative, symmetric distribution is stable, core-periphery distribution
is stable if it is an equilibrium8.





is seen in this equation, the eﬀect from a change in ¸ comes from the nominal wage diﬀerential and the price index
diﬀerencial.
11Firstly we observe symmetric distribution, where half of ﬁrms locate in each region. After
diﬀerentiating real wage diﬀerential respect to ¸ and evaluating at symmetric distribution, ¸ = 1=2,
we solve for the critical point of transport costs, Á. It would be written as,
Áb
C =
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
¡
1 ¡ ±b ¡ ±b´b¢
¡
1 + ±b + ±b´b¢ ;8b 2 fE;Rg (27)
When transport costs becomes lower than this critical point (higher Áb
C < Á), symmetric dis-
tribution is unstable. The lower subscript, C, expresses the speciﬁcation of outside option. At
this benchmark case we assume the outside option is that all workers who cannot retain their job
in unionized sector can ﬁnd their job in competitive sector, namely z = 1. Comparative statics
with bargaining parameters, ± and ´, are both negative, d
d±Áb
C < 0; d
d´Áb
C < 0. This shows that an
increase in the bargaining power of trade union decreases the break point.
Result 1 In general, an increase in the bargaining power of trade union may decrease the break
point Áb
C.
Symmetric equilibrium is never stable when (27) is negative. In order to rule out the case that
core-periphery distribution is always dominant, we assume two conditions. One is the non-black
hole condition, which is standard assumption on the location analysis, and the other is the non-black
hole condition of allocative eﬀect. The former one is obtained from the ﬁrst parenthesis, ¹ < ¾ ¡1.
The latter one is expressed by ±b ¡
´b + 1
¢
< 1. Without specifying the bargaining structure, this
composite is complicated to explain. Later, we may refer to this latter condition in detail. Note
that either of these two conditions can dominate the other.
Next, we observe core-periphery distribution, where all ﬁrms locate in one region. Evaluating
the real wage diﬀerential, (25), at core-periphery distribution as ¸ = 1, where all ﬁrms locate in one
region, as long as this real wage diﬀerential is positive, core-periphery distribution is sustainable,
otherwise, not. Examining this sustainability of core-periphery distribution, we could ﬁnd the
condition is not analytically solvable. However, the solution for the following equation is the critical


















We may refer to this transportation costs, ' 2 (0;1), as sustain point. Note that the property
of this sustainability point also rely on the same composite, ±b ¡
´b + 1
¢
as in the symmetry break
points.
12So far, we examine the location equilibrium in general form regardless of the labour market
institutions. Next, we specify the labour market institutions. Since the sustainability point of core-
periphery distribution is not analytically obtained, we focus on the analytical results of break point
for symmetric distribution.
3.1 Competitive labour market
Under b = C; there is no bargaining power in trade union. Using (8) and ¯ = 0; we have ±C =
¹=¾ and ´C = 0. Substituting these two bargaining structure-speciﬁc variables into the nominal
wage diﬀerence in (24), diﬀerentiating ¸ and evaluating it at 1=2, we could ﬁnd the symmetry break




(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
This is one of the results in the models of footloose entrepreneurs by Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003) and is originally shown in Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
3.2 Eﬃcient bargaining
Under b = E; we have (8) and ±E = ¹(1 ¡ ¯)=¾. Then ´E = ¹¯=±E¾ = ¯=(1 ¡ ¯):Substituting




2¾¸Á + (1 ¡ ¸)
¡
¾ ¡ ¹ + ¾Á2 + ¹Á2¢
2¾ (1 ¡ ¸)Á + ¸
¡
¾ ¡ ¹ + ¾Á2 + ¹Á2¢ (29)
This equation doesn’t include bargaining power. Thus it shows that the diﬀerence of nominal







(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
(30)
As we could see in the above equation, the symmetry break point is unaﬀected and is identical
to the case under competitive labour market.
Although there are trade unions and higher wage than competitive sector is set in manufacturing
sector, as long as the bargaining structure is eﬃcient bargaining, labour market imperfection doesn’t
aﬀect the bifurcation of location equilibrium. This is due to the fact that wage bargaining doesn’t
play the allocative role under eﬃcient bargaining.
As is observed in the previous section, workers receive higher wages than competitive sector and
this wage premium comes from a portion of entrepreneurs’ rewards as a consequence of negotiation.
However, this eﬃcient bargaining sets the same price with the one under competitive labour market.
13Thus output level of each diﬀerentiated ﬁrms is also the same with the one under competitive labour
market.
Proposition 1 Under eﬃcient bargaining structure, symmetry braking point is exactly the same
with the one without trade union and is unaﬀected by bargaining power.
This is due to the fact that eﬃcient bargaining aﬀect neither the price nor employment level,
compared to competitive labour market case.
3.3 Right to manage
On the other hand, under b = R, we have (9) and ±R = ¹=¾. Then ´R = (¾ ¡ 1)¹¯=(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)±R
= (¾ ¡ 1)¯=(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1). Since the equation of nominal wage diﬀerence under right to manage is




(¾ ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ ¹) + ¯¾ (1 ¡ ¹)
(¾ ¡ 1)(¾ + ¹) + ¯¾ (1 + ¹)
¶
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
(31)
The stable dispersed equilibrium under competitive labour market, ¯ = 0, is no longer stable
under imperfect labour market with trade union. If trade freeness Á increases further away from
ÁR
A, namely transport costs decreases, dispersed equilibrium is unstable. In order to examine the
eﬀect of trade union, starting from the case where the bargaining power of trade union is zero, there








(¾¯ ¡ ¹ ¡ ¾ + ¾¹ + ¾¯¹ + ¾2)
2
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
< 0
Comparing to each of the bargaining structures, sharp diﬀerence comes from the allocative role
of bargaining power. These results are summarized in the next proposition and drawn in Figure 2.
Proposition 2 Under right to manage bargaining structure, an increase in the bargaining power
of trade union decreases the symmetry break point Áb
C.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. In brief, the amount of regional income
sensitive to the location of ﬁrms matters. Positive bargaining power of trade union incurs wage
premium in manufacturing sector. This wage premium is accompanied with location choice of
manufacturing ﬁrms. Under eﬃcient bargaining, this wage premium is a kind of proﬁt sharing
without any changes in price and employment. A part of reward to entrepreneurs are now transferred
to workers in unionized sector. From the regional point of view, the amount of regional income
dependent on the location of ﬁrms is the same with competitive case. On the other hand, under right
14to manage, while bargaining power makes employment level lower, expenditure on manufacturing
goods remains unchanged. Then the allocative eﬀect stemmed from wage bargaining makes the
amount of income dependent on the location of ﬁrms larger than competitive labour market case and
the beneﬁt from the relocation of ﬁrms under lower transport costs becomes larger. This allocative
eﬀect comes not only from the region where the ﬁrm locates but also from the other region. In
the other words, comparing to the competitive labour market case, presence of wage premium and
double marginalization enable ﬁrms to steal some portion of manufactured goods expenditure from
the other region and this makes the amount of regional income dependent on the location of ﬁrms
larger. This attracts entrepreneurs to agglomerate in one region at even higher transport costs
(lower Á) comparing to competitive labour market. This means that bargaining power can play
a role that makes the home market eﬀect stronger. Thus the stable dispersed equilibrium under
competitive labour market, ¯ = 0, is no longer stable under imperfect labour market with trade
union.
4 Diﬀerent bargaining structures
We have examined diﬀerent labour market institutions. However, we pose an assumption that
each region has the same labour market institution. In this section, we relax this point. More
precisely, we could allow diﬀerent wage bargaining structures. Since we could not obtain analytical
solution for diﬀerent bargaining structures, we provide some simulation results. We set that while
in region 1, there is wage bargaining in the form of right to manage, in region 2, there is competitive
labour market. The stable location equilibrium is obtained from (24) with specifying the bargaining
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We choose the parameter values such that there are a interesting multi-equilibria case: ¾ =
6;¹ = 0:4; and bargaining power in region one is ¯1 = 0:01;¯2 = 0. With these values, the
diagram of stable location equilibria can be drawn as in Figure 3. Similar to the previous section,
stronger bargaining power can induce stronger home market eﬀect. In our simulations, the presence
of trade union in region 1 attracts entrepreneurs in region 1, where there is stronger trade union.
Thus the core-periphery distribution under diﬀerent wage bargaining structure has wider range of
sustainability in its distribution. As is shown in Figure 3, there is a small range that region 2
(periphery) can steal the core from region 1, multiple-equilibria. This range can emerge only when
the relative strength of bargaining power between two regions is very small, ¯1 ¡ ¯2 < 0:03 when
15¾ = 6;¹ = 0:4. When the relative strength of bargaining power between two regions is not small,
the range where periphery region can steal the core be vanished. Furthermore, even when both
regions are right to manage bargaining structure, if the relative diﬀerence of bargaining power is
small, we could obtain the same results and draw the diagram in Figure 3.
In sum, interesting multi-eruilibria can be obtained under the case that one region is with
right to manage bargaining structure and the other region is with any bargaining structure with
relatively small diﬀerence in bargaining power. When the relative diﬀerence is larger, the possible
range where region 2 can steal the core is vanished and the sustainable range of core-periphery
distribution becomes larger. Starting from core-periphery distribution, when the trade union in
core region is stronger than that in periphery, this core-periphery distribution is sustainable in
wider range than the case under symmetric bargaining power in both regions. This exhibits the
anchorage eﬀect by trade union in home region. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings by
Dewit et al. (2009). Furthermore, our result is similar to Munch (2003) who model Cournot type
monopolistic competition with unionized sector. An implicit assumption on our results and Munch
(2003) should be pointed out that monopolistic producers only locate in one place and produce at
the same place. This coincidence on the location of sales and production may leads to our results.
However, as long as the monopolistic producers are sensitive and attracted with larger market, our
results hold.
5 Welfare analysis
When agglomeration occurs, there are two advantages for living at core region from price
index eﬀect and market size eﬀect. Firstly, more ﬁrms come to the region, the price index in this
region becomes lower due to the fact that all products are domestic and do not incur transport costs.
Secondly, the move by entrepreneurs makes the regional income higher. This makes the home market
eﬀect larger. Hence each individual prefers residing in the core to the periphery. As entrepreneurs
can move to the core, they could enjoy higher welfare level, when there is agglomeration. On the
other hand, workers are immobile between regions. While there is a positive externality from the
move of entrepreneurs to the workers in the core, the workers in the periphery suﬀers negative
externality. In the core, workers enjoy higher welfare than under dispersed equilibrium just as
entrepreneurs. In the periphery, as the price index becomes higher for importing all products from
the core, immobile workers in the periphery are worse oﬀ. Welfare analysis on economic geography
model accompanies opposite interest groups against the change of ﬁrms’ distribution. Thus the
detailed analysis based on the geographically diﬀerent interest groups would be ambiguous results
16and is very complicated9. Since one of our focuses is the comparison among the diﬀerent bargaining
structures and competitive labour market, for this purpose, we employ the total social welfare
function ( hereafter SWF) of this economy. Depending on the distribution of ﬁrms and bargaining

















¹ ;8b 2 C;E;R and 8 j 2 A;D (33)
The lower subscript (j) of SWF indicates the distribution of ﬁrms. While j = A is the agglomerated
core-periphery structure (¸ = 1), j = D; is the symmetrically dispersed case (¸ = 1=2). This
functional form of SWF is a special case of CES class, where there is no inequality aversion and
it can be recognized as utilitarian welfare function. In the following analysis, the rank of SWF is
simply ordered by the value of total SWF10.For comparison of SWF, we set the diﬀerence of SWF
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For example, if we use regional expenditure, a comparison between agglomeration and dispersion


























Between all the range of transport costs [0;1], this function cross at least once with x-axis: there
is a critical value which expresses the change on the socially preferable location equilibrium. We refer
to this critical value by using hat as, b Áb
c; where D bb
AD = 0:When there is no transport costs, Á = 1, the
welfare in each location equilibrium is identical, D bb
AD = 0:When Á > b Áb
c; we have D bb
AD < 0:Then
dispersed distribution equilibrium is socially preferred. On the other hand, when Á < b Áb
c; we have
D bb
AD > 0:Then agglomerated core-periphery structure is preferred. For the following analysis,
the necessary comparisons are performed in Appendix II. When the comparisons are performed
under the same institution, D CC
AD;D EE
AD;D RR
AD, the results are nonlinear and diﬃcult to be shown
analytically. Although the critical value, b Áb
c, cannot be obtained analytically, its existences are
conﬁrmed in Appendix II. On the other hand, comparisons across diﬀerent institutions in the same






DD; are solved analytically. In Table 1, for
9Using Krugman’s core-periphery model, Charlot, Gaigne, Robert-Nicoud and Thisse (2006) show that both lo-
cation equilibrium, dispersion and agglomeration, are not Pareto dominant. They also show that under suﬃciently
low transport costs, agglomeration is socially preferable including compensation scheme. Otherwise, it is impossible
to disentangle the diﬀerent geographical groups.
10We set the same normalization as in the previous section, H = L = 1:
17the plausible parameters, we compute the break point and sustain point of market outcome and
that of social break point where socially preferred location equilibrium changes.
(i) Competitive labour market (b = C)
When transportation costs are very high, SWF of dispersion is higher, DCC
AD < 0. On the other
hand, when transportation costs decrease, there is a critical value that agglomeration is socially
preferred to dispersion, DCC
AD = 0. Further decrease in transport costs makes the gradient of the
agglomeration superiority decrease. In the end, when transportation costs vanish, Á = 0, total social
welfare functions under agglomeration and dispersion are identical, DCC
AD = 0. Socially optimal
change of location equilibria is induced at the point that c ÁC
c = 0:747 when ¾ = 6;¹ = 0:4. Note
that c ÁC
c is larger than the symmetry break point, ÁC
c = 0:745 from (30), resulted from the market
outcome. With these values and under certain transport costs ÁC
c < Á < c ÁC
c ; while market outcome
leads to core-periphery distribution, symmetrically dispersed distribution is socially preferred. This
implies there might be excessive agglomeration. For example in the ﬁrst and second columns of
Table 1 , excess agglomeration may occur only when expenditure share is relatively low. On the
other hand, when expenditure share is relatively high, the symmetry break from market outcome
is larger than socially preferred one, c ÁC
c < ÁC
c and implies there might be less agglomeration.
(ii) Eﬃcient bargaining (b = E)
In this case, regional income is boiled down into the same with competitive labour market case.
So there is no change with competitive labour market. However, this is due to our simpliﬁed SWF
adopted here, it cannot reﬂect inequality of wealth among individuals. As in Charlot et al. (2006)




(iii) Right to manage (b = R)
Socially optimal change of location equilibria is induced at the point that c ÁR
c = 0:726 when
¾ = 6;¹ = 0:4;¯ = 0:1. Note that c ÁR
c is smaller than ÁR
c = 0:736 from (31). From Table 1, under
right to manage and positive bargaining power, most of the symmetry break point from market
outcome are larger than socially preferred one. This implies that there is little excess agglomeration
case, ÁR
c < c ÁR
c : Thus under right to manage bargaining, there might be less agglomeration.
Summing up the results from these comparisons on location equilibria between market out-
come and social optimal, when there is no trade union, the parameter range for socially excessive
agglomeration, ÁC
c < Á < c ÁC
c , is the largest. On the other hand, when there are trade unions
and the bargaining power becomes stronger, this parameter range becomes smaller and socially
agglomeration is preferred.
Proposition 3 When the bargaining power of trade union becomes stronger, agglomeration is so-
18cially preferable.
6 Extensions
So far, avoiding the complicated expressions, we assume that all of the workers in unionized
sector would be reemployed in competitive sector when they cannot work in the same sector. How-
ever, this benchmark case couldn’t explain the various possibilities of obtaining the other jobs.
Some might be able to obtain their job in unionized sector, again. Some may not be able to obtain
their job in competitive sector. In order to make more realistic implications, we extend the speciﬁ-
cation of outside option into several environments. The following extensions can be interpreted as
frictional reemployment in unionized sector or frictional unemployment. Diﬀerent speciﬁcation of
outside option can be interpreted as the diﬀerent regional characteristics. In the line with Lejour
and Verbon (1996), the outside options are taken the form of expected probability of obtaining a
status. For simple analysis, we set them as a binary choice as follows.
Benchmark : All reemployed in C sector:
(1) Case MC : Reemployed in M sector, °, or in C sector, 1 ¡ °
(2) Case MU : Reemployed in M sector, 1 ¡ Ã, or in unemployed, Ã
(3) Case CU : Reemployed in C sector, 1 ¡ Ã; or unemployed, Ã
zr = 1
zr = °wr + (1 ¡ °)
zr = (1 ¡ Ã)wr + Ãb
zr = (1 ¡ Ã) + Ãb
(35)
where ° is the probability of reemployed in M sector and Ã is the probability of unemployed for
a worker who cannot get a job in the same ﬁrm after the bargaining and b expresses unemployment
beneﬁt which is levied in lump sum manner. This outside option acts as an expected wage when
the worker cannot get his job in the unionized sector. Suppose under case MU and there are ¸r of
M sector-ﬁrms in region r; regional unemployment rate, ur, is simply expressed as ur = ¸rÃ. Since
0 · ¸r · 1 and b < 1; zr is a decreasing function of Ã. Note that as we set the total number of
ﬁrms one, unemployment rate is equivalent to regional unemployment.
Since we set the outside options in each region endogenous, we need to solve them. In each cases
above, ﬁrstly we solve the regional unionized wage and fall-back point with using (9) or (8), and
(35) simultaneously. From (9) or (8), we know that under both bargaining structures, unionized
wage is the same. Thus unionized wage and fall-back point is the same regardless of the bargaining
structure. Using the speciﬁed unionized wage and fall-back point according to the above cases, we
plug them into (27) to observe the symmetry break point. Detailed derivations for each cases can
be found in appendix III.
(i) Case MC
19Outside option in this case is composed of the reemployment in M-sector and in C-sector. Each
probability is expressed by ° and 1¡°. We are interested in the relation between the transportation
costs and the distribution of ﬁrms. This is captured by the symmetry breaking point. After some
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¶
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
(37)
This case explicitly examine not unemployment but reemployment probability in unionized
sector. Since zMC = °wr +(1 ¡ °) = ° (wr ¡ 1)+1 > 1, this is a case such that the outside option
is clearly above the benchmark case where all can be employed in competitive sector.
(ii) Case MU
The outside option is depicted by reemployed in M-sector and unemployed to receive beneﬁt.
When individuals are unemployed, they receive unemployment beneﬁt from government. This




¾Ãb(1 ¡ ¹) + ¹(¾ ¡ 1) ¡ ¹(1 ¡ Ã)(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)
¾Ãb(1 + ¹) ¡ ¹(¾ ¡ 1) + ¹(1 ¡ Ã)(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)
¶
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)





¾Ãb(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)¹) + ¹(¾ ¡ 1)
2 (1 ¡ ¯) + ¹(1 ¡ Ã)(¾ ¡ 1)(¯ ¡ 1)(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)
¾Ãb(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)(1 + (1 ¡ ¯)¹) ¡ ¹(¾ ¡ 1)
2 (1 ¡ ¯) ¡ ¹(1 ¡ Ã)(¾ ¡ 1)(¯ ¡ 1)(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)
!
£
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
(39)
Unemployment beneﬁt should be lower than the wage in competitive sector. In this case,
depending on the unemployment rate, the outside option can be varied around benchmark case,
zMU = Ãb + (1 ¡ Ã)w > (<)1.
(iii) Case CU
The outside option is described by being reemployed in C-sector and being unemployed to receive
beneﬁt. When individuals are unemployed, they receive unemployment beneﬁt from government.




(¾ ¡ ¹) ¡ Ã¾ (1 ¡ b)(1 ¡ ¹)
(¾ + ¹) ¡ Ã¾ (1 ¡ b)(1 + ¹)
¶
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)





(¾ ¡ 1)(¾ ¡ ¹) + ¯¾ (1 ¡ ¹) ¡ Ã¾ (1 ¡ b)(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¹)
(¾ ¡ 1)(¾ + ¹) + ¯¾ (1 + ¹) ¡ Ã¾ (1 ¡ b)(¾ + ¯ ¡ 1)(1 + ¹)
¶
(¾ ¡ ¹ ¡ 1)
(¾ + ¹ ¡ 1)
(41)
The outside option is lower than the benchmark case, zCU = Ãb + (1 ¡ Ã) = 1 ¡ Ã (1 ¡ b) < 1.
Comparison among cases
Benchmark case and the extensions are consistently related with each other. Starting from the
case studied in the previous sections, the benchmark case where all can obtain job in competitive
20sector is identical to the case MC when ° = 0, no possibility of obtaining job in M sector. When
u = 0 under Case CU, no unemployment, this is identical to the benchmark case. From the above
results, in each cases, symmetry break point under eﬃcient bargaining is larger than that under
right to manage. From our analytical results in Appendix III, we could conﬁrm that increase in
unemployment rate induces the break point larger, which means that the stable range of symmetric
distribution becomes larger. On the other hand, more generous unemployment beneﬁt could induces
the break point smaller, which means that the stable range of symmetric distribution becomes
smaller.
Proposition 4 Regional diﬀerences of employment environments have unambiguous eﬀect on sta-
bility of location equilibria. In particular, lower unemployment rate and generous unemployment
beneﬁt induces symmetric distribution of ﬁrms more unstable.
7 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, wage bargaining structure and location of ﬁrms are examined in the model
of economic geography. It is shown that the presence of trade union and stronger bargaining
power makes home market eﬀect stronger. This is induced by allocative eﬀect from immobile
workers of both regions to entrepreneurs and is from the increase in the amount of regional income
dependent on location of ﬁrms. While under eﬃcient bargaining this eﬀect is absent, under right
to manage bargaining we could observe this positive eﬀect. Moreover, we analyze the eﬀects of
asymmetric regions, that is diﬀerent bargaining structures on location equilibrium. When the
location equilibrium is core-periphery structure, relatively stronger trade union in core region makes
the agglomeration force stronger and this core-periphery structure more stable. This can be applied
not only to the benchmark case but also the cases including several employment environments.
We explicitly introduce several unemployment circumstances, which is the outside option of
workers. In particular, we allow the unemployment circumstances and the bargaining process to
vary across several cases. It is analytically shown that the diﬀerent unemployment circumstances
aﬀect the stability of symmetrically distributed ﬁrms. When there are unemployed, unemployment
insurance is introduced in a lump sum manner. We show that not only the degree of bargaining
power of trade union but also the unemployment beneﬁt can play a role as a centrifugal force. A
key message of the paper is that generous unemployment beneﬁt and higher trade union make the
distribution of ﬁrms more dispersed and stable. This is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings by
Dewit et al. (2009). Note that there is an implicit assumption on location of sales and production
21which should be the same place. In the process of enlargement of EU, residents in the original EU
member countries do not have to worry about the relocation of ﬁrms from their countries to newly
member countries.
Furthermore our welfare analysis reveals that there is an eﬀect from stronger trade union on
the socially optimal location structure. When the labour market is competitive, there is a certain
possible parameter range which allows excessive agglomeration. If the bargaining power of trade
union becomes stronger, this possible range of excessive agglomeration shrinks and that of less
agglomeration expands.
Appendix I
Derivations of (9) and (8) are straight forward in the two steps. Under Right to manage (R),
after the bargaining over wage between the trade union and the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm sets their price.










After solving for wi and plugging it into proﬁt function in (5), maximization of proﬁt function
respect to price yields the equations in (9).
Under Eﬃcient bargaining (E), wages and prices (employment) are jointly determined by using
Nash-solution. Maximization of (7) respect to w(i) and l(i) yields the same equation in the above















Solving these two equation simultaneously, we obtain the equations in (8).
Appendix II
We could readily obtain the SWF for agglomeration and dispersion by using (33). Note that
the rewards for entrepreneurs in each bargaining structure are the same regardless of the location
equilibrium, W b
A = W b
D and that under competitive labour market, there is no bargaining power on
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22The lower subscript indicates the location structure of the global welfare. A is under agglomer-
ation and D is under dispersion. For more in detail, we obtain for all cases.
W C








































> > > > > > =
> > > > > > ;
(A3)



















1 + ±b + ±b´b¢
¡
1 ¡ ±b´b ¡ ±b¢
!
The upper subscripts indicate the bargaining structure of the comparison and lower subscript
DA expresses this diﬀerence is the comparison from dispersed structure to agglomeration. When this
D
b1b2
AD = 0; socially preferable location equilibrium changes from symmetrically dispersed distribution
to agglomerated core-periphery distribution. b1 and b2 correspond to the bargaining structure of D
and A. Using (34) and above equations, we could perform the comparisons among diﬀerent labour
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(¾+°¡¾°¡¯°¡1). Substituting these results into bargaining parameter ´, ´E
MC =
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parameters, we obtain the expression in the text.
Case MU












these parameters, we obtain the expression in the text.
23Case CU
Following above cases, we obtain w =
(¾+¯¡1)(bÃ¡Ã+1)
(¾¡1) ; z = (bÃ ¡ Ã + 1). Using these re-
sults, we have bargaining parameter in each case as ´E
CU =
(¯+Ã¡bÃ¡¾Ã¡¯Ã+b¾Ã+b¯Ã)
(1¡Ã+bÃ)(1¡¯) , and ´R
CU =
(¯+Ã¡bÃ¡¾Ã¡¯Ã+b¾Ã+b¯Ã)(¾¡1)
(bÃ¡Ã+1)(¾+¯¡1) . From these parameters, we obtain the expression in the text.
Comparative statics of symmetry break point w.r.t. Ã and b
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Figure 2  Stable distribution of firms and the effect of stronger bargining power










Figure 3  Stable distribution of firms under different bargaining structures and the
effect of stronger bargining power under right to manage bargaining
                [region 1 : right to manage, region 2 : efficient bargaining]